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After I visited the country of Turkey, one
main observation struck me as puzzling and
almost ironic. In a land where secularism reigns
supreme, the founder and enforcer of secular-
ism himself, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, is revered
in a seemingly God-like manner. His presence
is pervasive throughout society, not only in
the actual laws and establishments of the coun-
try, but also through the abundance of portraits
and statues dedicated to him. The solemn
expression and piercing blue eyes of the Father
of the Turks gazed at me from the walls of
government buildings, posters adorning the
streets, and bronzed statues strategically erected
at places of prominence. In recent years
Atatürk’s presence has only intensified, as the
so-called Kemalist form of secularism estab-
lished by the former leader has been the nexus
of a whirlwind of controversy regarding rising
tensions between Islamic and secular groups in
Turkey.
On the surface Turkey appears to be the
very archetype of successful reconciliation
between tradition and modernity; Turkey can be
described without mutual exclusivity as both a
Muslim country and a contemporary, secular
republic. Yet stirrings of discontent towards sec-
ularism in its current form seem to be rising
with the movement that many scholars have
deemed the new Islamic revival. When Recep
Tayyip Erdog˘an became the prime minister of
Turkey in 2002, he assumed the responsibility
of leading a country with a population of approx-
imately 76 million people, 99.8 percent of whom
are Muslim, and a constitution that pronounces
the country a democratic, secular state. (The
World Factbook) The ascent to power by the rul-
ing political party, the AKP or Justice and Devel-
opment Party, to which Erdog˘an belongs, served
as a catalyst for the upsurge of tensions that had
been brewing under Turkey’s surface in the
minds of secularists and traditional Islamists
alike. Although recent political developments






groups, long-standing socioeconomic dispari-
ties within Turkey have exacerbated the issue.
Vast inequalities in education, wealth, and
employment among different regions of Turkey
have caused a schism in the population that is
evident in public reactions to political maneu-
vers by the AKP, a party with Islamic roots and
arguably an Islamic-based agenda.
In the first part of this article I seek to
examine these inequalities and their roots,
emphasizing the role of education and fusing
past and present. I then demonstrate that the
AKP is in a sense a manifestation of the socio-
economic disparities in the population that play
a pivotal role in the current battle between
Kemalist secularism and the dominant Mus-
lim religion of Turkey.
Historical Overview
Turkey has a long-standing history as a
Muslim country. The conquest of the Byzantines
and the creation of the first Turkish state by the
Seljuk Turks at the end of the eleventh cen-
tury assisted in ushering in a new Islamic era
for the Anatolia region, replacing the Byzantine
leaders with a new leadership of Muslim Turks.
(Glazer, p. 13) The growth of the Ottoman
Empire during the period from the fourteenth
to the seventeenth centuries established Islam
as the de facto ruler of Turkey, as the Ottoman
sultans acted as political, military, judicial,
and religious leaders following the Islamic code
of law, the sharia. By the nineteenth century,
some of the intellectual and liberal-minded
members of the elite class began to rally for
Westernization of the empire, citing the need
for a secular state. (p. 26) These individuals,
along with young officers and students with
European or Western educations, united in
the early 1900s to restore a constitutional par-
liamentary system in Turkey, which had been
transiently created and suspended by the reign-
ing sultan. (p. 27)
With the end of World War I in 1918 came
the end of the Ottoman Empire. Atatürk, an
army commander during the war, led a success-
ful nationalist movement that resisted the
partitioning of the empire by Allied forces and
resulted in the creation of the Grand National
Assembly in 1920. (p. 34) In October of 1923,
the Republic of Turkey came into existence with
Atatürk as its leader, and a flood of reforms
ensued. (p. 36) These reforms and the robust
legacy left by Atatürk’s rule built the founda-
tions of Turkey that have in recent years been
exposing cracks and faults as the architecture
of a nation is being reexamined.
Atatürk sought the complete moderniza-
tion of Turkey based on Western models and
undertook dizzying reforms in an attempt to
achieve this. He believed that the key to creat-
ing a modern nation-state was secularization,
and he instituted a system resembling French
laicism, in which religion is brought under
the control of the state in order to protect the
separation of the two. In 1924 Atatürk abolished
the caliphate and established the Directorate
of Religious Affairs to preside over matters of
religion. The next few years saw the imple-
mentation of a new Latin alphabet; European
criminal, civil, and commercial codes; and
secularism in the constitution of the Repub-
lic. (Alam, p. 356)
In recent years, this form of Kemalist
secularism begun by Atatürk has been put
under the magnifying glass, largely as a result
of the AKP’s rise to power. Those particu-
larly critical of the interface between reli-
gion and government are largely members of
a new Islamic revival of sorts; it is a movement
that advocates an increasing presence of
Islam in Turkey’s laws, or at least a decreasing
presence of certain secularist restrictions. This
revival has taken on several different forms, as
is heavily discussed in the current literature
on the subject. While some argue that the
Islamic revival is a reactionary movement with
a political undercurrent, others proclaim that
it is a resurgence based on the desire of some
parts of the population to assert their religious
identity.
Regardless of the motives of the move-
ment’s proponents, there exists a sharp polar-
ization between those who support and those
who feel threatened by the Islamic efforts.
I focus next on how this polarization is closely
linked to demographic and socioeconomic
disparities in Turkey’s many regions. I first
analyze the current socioeconomic dispari-
ties within the country, and then examine
how the ruling party and religious-political




The Turkish Statistical Institute projects
that Turkey’s population (76 million in 2010)
will grow to approximately 84 million by the
year 2020. A study of demographic data and
socioeconomic factors including wealth,
employment, and education in this growing
population reveals major regional differences
and an even greater divide between East and
West. For the purposes of this article, these
regions are identified as Marmara, Aegean, Cen-
tral Anatolia, Black Sea, Mediterranean, South-
east Anatolia, and Eastern Anatolia. (TurkStat)
According to the CIA World Factbook, about
69 percent of the population was considered
urban in the year 2006, with urban areas defined
as those areas with 10,000 or more inhabitants.
The most urbanized areas in Turkey are concen-
trated in the Western portion of the country,
while the least urbanized area is Southeastern
Anatolia. (“Turkey, Joint Poverty . . . ,” p. 31)
The concentration of wealth is tightly
linked to urbanization, with the Marmara region
being the wealthiest and Southeastern Anatolia
being the poorest region, according to theWorld
Bank Joint Poverty Assessment Report. (p. 31)
The poverty rate for urban residents in 2007
was a little over 10 percent, while the rate for
rural residents was about 33 percent. (Turkey’s
Statistical Yearbook 2008, p. 352) Turkey’s 2008
Statistical Yearbook reports that the average
income of workers in urban areas in 2005 was
approximately $6,344 versus $2,864 for work-
ers in rural areas.1 (p. 345) Unemployment is also
amajor concern in Turkey with an overall unem-
ployment rate of 10.8 percent in early 2008 (12.7
percent in urban areas versus 7.6 percent in rural
areas). (Library of Congress) However, while
unemployment rates remain higher in urban
areas, the European Training Foundation (ETF)
explains that rural unemployment is not accu-
rately reported and that there are extremely high
unemployment levels in the Southeast Anatolia
region. Furthermore, the ETF reports the at-risk-
of-poverty rate among the working population to
be 22.7 percent, compared to a 7 percent rate for
European Union countries. (“ETF Country Plan
2009: Turkey,” p. 2)
Inequalities in Education
While Turkey’s educational system offers
schooling from the preschool level through
higher education, only eight years of primary
schooling are compulsory for individuals
between the ages of six and fourteen. Secondary
education is available through general high
schools or more specialized vocational schools,
like those focusing on technical, agricultural,
or religious education. When students complete
secondary education, they may take the univer-
sity entrance exam and, if successful, can con-
tinue onto the university level.
When Atatürk came to power, he solidified
a compulsory education program at the primary
level for all of Turkey; however, issues of acces-
sibility, family responsibilities toward chil-
dren, and lack of resources prevented his edu-
cational aims from reaching many Turks. While
great strides have been made and the majority
of Turks now attend at least primary school, divi-
sions still exist, especially at regional levels, and
a primary schooling rate of 100 percent remains
to be achieved.
Education is perhaps the single most
important factor in the determination of
poverty. Studies show that poverty rates consis-
tently decrease as years of education increase.
In fact, the education level of the head of the
household has been proven to be more crucial
than gender or unemployment in determining
household poverty in Turkey, and households
whose heads are illiterate or who did not grad-
uate from primary school have a poverty rate
double that of the national rate. (“Turkey,
Joint Poverty . . . ,” p. 30)
As reported by the Ministry of Education,
for the 2004/2005 academic year gross school-
ing ratios of primary education were lowest
for the regions of Eastern, Southeastern, and
Central Anatolia respectively, and were high-
est for the Marmara and Aegean regions. Gross
schooling ratios indicate the proportion of the
population between the ages of 6–13 attend-
ing school at the primary level. (“Reviews of
National Policies . . . ,” p. 27) Similarly, in
2008 the highest gross schooling ratios were
seen in the Marmara and Aegean regions and
the lowest in Central and Northeast Anatolia and
East Black Sea.2 Furthermore, it is notewor-
thy that slight regional disparities at the primary
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1I used an exchange rate of 1.341 Turkish lira to 1 U.S.
dollar for 2005 data. (OECD StatExtracts)
level become progressively more pronounced
with each schooling level thereafter, as reflected
by high school graduation rates. (TurkStat)
Even with a compulsory primary educa-
tion system in place, vast inequalities exist in
terms of quality of education. Students of higher
socioeconomic status and from more educated
backgrounds are more likely to attend the most
selective high schools, which provide the high-
est quality of education. Graduates of more
selective schools had higher average PISA test
scores, which measure mathematics, reading,
and science performance. Of particular impor-
tance are data that show a positive correlation
between PISA scores and community size,
with village communities having the lowest
scores. (“OECD Economic Surveys: Turkey,”
p. 158)
Factors Contributing to the Divide
As the Turkey ETF Country Plan explains,
“Western Turkey has good economic conditions,
with industries competing at global levels,
higher employment rates and better and more
balanced access to education and higher educa-
tional attainment levels. The Eastern provinces
of Turkey are more rural, with low employment
rates and poorer educational attainment.” (p. 2)
It is also noteworthy that the inherent diffi-
culties experienced in transportation and access
within the harsher geographical terrain and cli-
matic conditions of the East and Southeast have
exacerbated the diminished economic and
educational opportunities in these areas. His-
torically, these difficulties have been an impor-
tant factor in the effective distribution of lim-
ited government resources between East and
West due to higher delivery costs and lower
quality of personnel and infrastructure in the
eastern regions.
Several important periods in Turkey’s his-
tory have likely contributed to the tremen-
dous disparities that permeate society. Some
believe that Atatürk’s reforms exacerbated dis-
parities because of their “top-down” nature, in
which Kemalism was supported and enforced by
the elite class and failed to cover society’s lower
strata. Thus, the majority of the traditional,
poor, or rural masses remained faithful to
their religious way of life, while the secularist
ideals created by Atatürk radiated throughout
the bureaucratic sectors of society. (Karasipahi,
p. 93) In addition, Professor Rossella Bottoni,
a Research Fellow at Catholic University,
explains that the rapid pace of Atatürk’s reforms
did not allow the masses to undergo a gradual
adjustment or “soft transition,” which most
likely hindered the infusion of reforms into
some sectors of society. For instance, the new
Turkish alphabet was approved in November
1928 and was fully implemented into book pub-
lication by January 1929, enabling the entire
population for the first time to be able to read
the language they spoke. (Bottoni, p. 185) An
important note apropos the correlation between
education and religion is raised by Sena Karasi-
pahi, who explains that the “moral vacuum” that
emerged in the newly-mobilized rural masses
when Atatürk’s educational reforms failed to
affect them “became filled with Islamic ideology
after the 1950s.” (p. 93) I explore the link
between socioeconomic levels, education, and
the Islamic revival in the following sections.
Socioeconomic Status and Religion
While the distribution of “religiousness”
across society is not as easily quantified as
wealth or education, several polls and studies
have attempted to do so. I use these measure-
ments to analyze the correlation between
socioeconomic disparities and religious pref-
erences. While public opinion surveys must be
evaluated with a critical eye, they still paint a
broad picture of attitudes that may be prevalent.
Ali Çarkog˘lu and Binnaz Toprak conducted a
study of religion, society, and politics in 1999
and again in 2006. According to their find-
ings, the percentage of people who defined
themselves as “very religious” increased from
6 percent to 13 percent, and those who defined
themselves as “primarily Muslim” increased
from 36 percent to 46 percent over this seven-
year period. The authors found a clear diver-
gence of self-proclaimed identities when indi-
viduals were asked to rate themselves on a scale
of 0 to 10, with 0 meaning “secular” and 10
meaning “Islamist.” Of the 48.5 percent who
veered towards the Islamist end of the spectrum,
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2I calculated gross schooling ratios for 2008 by using
2008 data for the number of students at the primary level
divided by the population between 5–14 years of age. (Turk-
Stat)
there was a high correlation with rural settle-
ment areas, low income, and inadequate educa-
tion. Furthermore, for illiterate individuals (6.9
percent of the total people polled) the average
was 7 on the 10 point scale, while for university
graduates (9.2 percent of the people polled)
the average was 3.9. When asked to select an
identity, those with higher educational levels
were more likely to define themselves as a
“citizen of the Turkish Republic” and were more
likely to select “secular” and “not very religious”
as characteristics. Çarkog˘lu and Toprak also
found that the majority of individuals who
selected a Muslim identity were from the low-
est income bracket, lived in more rural areas,
were predominantly women, and were more
likely to be illiterate.
Extrapolation from the data presented
here shows first that socioeconomic dispari-
ties remain prevalent and problematic in Turkey.
Second, it shows that education is the most
important predictor of other socioeconomic fac-
tors and that critical regional inequalities in
education still exist in Turkey. Finally, these
existing divisions are analogous to divisions in
religiousness. I explore the correlation between
these data and voter preference and opinion
next.
Overview of Political Parties
Turkey has a short but multifaceted his-
tory as a constitutional parliamentary system,
with transitions from single party to multiparty
elections, changes of power between left- and
right-oriented political parties, and oscillations
among coalition-party, single-party, and mili-
tary-ruled governments. Over the past few years,
the CHP, MHP, and AKP have been the most
prominent political parties in existence and have
captured the majority of the public’s vote.
The Republican People’s Party, the CHP, is
the oldest political party in the country and is
identified as a center-left party with staunch
adherence to Atatürk’s principles. (Hooglund,
p. 262) The Nationalist Movement Party, the
MHP, entered the political arena as a far-right,
nationalist party and still retains this identity.
(Sayarı, p. 14) The Justice and Development
Party, the AKP, identifies itself as a conservative
party and is linked to Islamist roots. Although
Islamist parties have never had a stronghold
in Turkey’s political history, another party, the
Welfare Party, gained the first significant polit-
ical victory for an Islamist party in 1995 when
it achieved 21.4 percent of the popular vote,
although the party was later forced by the mil-
itary to dissolve for violating the principle of
constitutional secularism. (p. 16)
The AKP took office following the gen-
eral election in November 2002, which gave the
party 34.3 percent of the general vote. Recep
Tayyip Erdog˘an assumed the role of prime min-
ister in 2003. President Ahmet Necdet Sezer was
replaced by AKP member Abdullah Gül in April
2007 after Erdog˘an called for an early general
election due to a storm of controversy in which
the military and prominent individuals from
opposing parties publicly declared their dis-
agreement with Erdog˘an’s nomination of
Gül. The 2007 general election validated the
AKP’s dominance in Turkey when the party
gained 46.6 percent of the popular vote. (Jenk-
ins, pp. 6–7)
In the past eight years, the AKP has cap-
tured unprecedented support at the polls, due
in part to its mobilization of grassroots support
throughout Anatolia and Eastern Turkey. While
all three of the dominant political parties —
AKP, MHP, and CHP— are represented in urban
regions and among the top echelons of soci-
ety, the same does not hold true throughout the
remaining segments of Turkey. In fact, the lead-
ing opposition is severely lagging behind
throughout the widespread areas where the AKP
derives some of its highest numbers of votes. An
examination of the AKP constituency unique to
the party in the following section reveals a
correlation between geographic regions of
support and socioeconomic status.
Demographics of the Justice and
Development Party
The role of the AKP as a manifestation of
the disparities within Turkey’s population is evi-
dent by the parallels between the party’s vot-
ing constituency and their socioeconomic sta-
tus. This manifestation is increasingly palpable
when one examines the public reactions to
recent political maneuvers of the party that have
been especially incendiary, as I will discuss later.
Election data available from the Turkish
Statistical Institute details the number of total
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deputies elected to parliament for each party
from Turkey’s regions according to TurkStat
regional definitions. Within these regions,
patterns emerge when 2002 and 2007 general
election data are compared. Of the 363 seats won
by the AKP in 2002, the greatest numbers come
from the Istanbul, Mediterranean, and Aegean
regions. These were also regions of strong
support for the CHP in 2002; yet the two parties
differ greatly in Southeast Anatolia, which
contributed 37 deputies from the AKP and 13
from the CHP. This difference became more
exaggerated in 2007, when the CHP gained only
3 deputies from the region. In both years, the
AKP received the least support from West Mar-
mara. While very densely populated regions,
such as Istanbul, Aegean, and Eastern Marmara,
are not significantly different in political pref-
erences for the two leading parties, it appears
that Anatolia remained loyal to the AKP and
West Marmara to the CHP. This division deep-
ens the cracks that have been chiseled into
Turkey’s landscape by socioeconomic dispari-
ties, especially on a broad scale of East versus
West.
Several studies have supported the con-
nection between party preference, geographic
location, and socioeconomic level. According to
a public poll performed before the 2002 election,
60 percent of the AKP’s supporters in 2002
had education below the secondary level, 30 per-
cent had a high school level of education, and
only 10 percent had education above the high
school level. The corresponding values for the
CHP were 37.3 percent, 40.1 percent, and 22.6
percent respectively. (Aydın and Dalmıs , p. 213)
When the research agency Pollmark conducted
a similar poll in 2006, the percentage breakdown
of predominant attributes for the AKP remained
approximately the same. (p. 218)
The previously discussed study by
Çarkog˘lu and Toprak reaffirms these findings.
The authors explain that “the more conserva-
tive group of rural voters who see themselves
closer to the religious and Islamist sector and
who have a relatively lower socio-economic sta-
tus have a more positive approach [to the AKP],
whereas urban voters, who ideologically see
themselves closer to the leftist and secular
sector and who have a relatively higher socio-
economic status, generally assess AKP nega-
tively.” (p. 35) Of those who defined them-
selves predominantly as citizens of the Turk-
ish republic, 46.1 percent support the CHP
and 23.1 percent support the AKP. Incredibly, of
those who defined themselves foremost as Mus-
lim, 60 percent support the AKP and only 20.9
percent support the CHP. The Pollmark study
from March 2006 echoes these findings, reveal-
ing that the self-chosen identities of religious,
rightist, and conservative were significantly
higher among supporters of the AKP than other
political parties, with the selection of religious
and conservative actually increasing from
2002 to 2006. (Aydın and Dalmıs, p. 219) Thus,
there are parallels between differences in geo-
graphical regions distinctly loyal to the AKP and
differences in socioeconomic indictors of
Turkey’s regions.
The heavy concentration of grassroots sup-
port for the AKP is a phenomenon seemingly
stemming from seeds that previous Islamist-
based parties had planted. The center-periphery
model is frequently utilized throughout the
literature as an explanation of Turkey’s political
and social structure. This model pits Turkey’s
elite, secularist center against the masses that
make up the surrounding periphery. The CHP
is then the party of the center; and as Frank
Tachau, a professor of political science, explains,
its power was lost in the 1950 election due to its
inability to translate republican reforms into
substantial advancements in average living con-
ditions. (p. 39) These alleged “top-down”
reforms of Atatürk, as earlier discussed, were
challenged in the 1960s by “bottom-up” reforms
of Islamist movements that attempted to pro-
vide direction to lower segments of society
through education. (Karasipahi, p. 101) Islamic
parties gained momentum by appealing to con-
servative or economically deprived masses and
championing a more equal distribution of
wealth, which was much needed following a
period of migration to urban areas in the coun-
try that resulted in an abundance of shanty-
towns and cultural isolation. (p. 96)
Any government that attempts to oper-
ate “by the people, for the people” must then be
representative of the people. The AKP has in
large part given a voice to those who other-
wise may not be heard. Many feel that the top-
down style of secularism ingrained in Turkish
society halted the progress and mobility of many
groups, particularly those affiliated with reli-
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gion. (Yilmaz, p. 119) These groups have since
gained influence, in addition to receiving valu-
able socioeconomic services overseen by the
AKP, such as improvements in health care,
housing, infrastructure, and student grants.
Though this article examines the over-
whelming grassroots support of the AKP, it
would be erroneous to suggest that the party
receives no backing from the upper echelons
of Turkey’s socioeconomic ladder. In recent
years, noteworthy support for the AKP has been
seen among urban dwellers, businessmen and
entrepreneurs, and individuals of middle or high
socioeconomic status. However, this segment of
the party’s constituency appears to act more out
of economic motives rather than ideological
motives, particularly in the open economies of
the western provinces as opposed to agricultural
economies of central rural provinces. (Çarkog˘lu,
p. 17) Financial crises during 2000 and 2001 and
dismal economic conditions, along with the
AKP’s pro-market stance and allegiance to pri-
vatization and stabilization, set the stage for the
AKP to provide the Turkish public with an
economic rescue of sorts from the failures of
existing parties. Although this sector of support
is an important fragment of the Turkish polit-
ical landscape, a detailed analysis is beyond
the scope of this article, which aims to prima-
rily explore the vast grassroots population
that is unique to the AKP.
The Headscarf Debate
Since the AKP’s rise to power, the party has
been a hotbed of controversy. Polarization
among segments of society has become increas-
ingly pronounced following the threat of party
dissolution in 2008, when the AKP was accused
of violating the constitutional principle of sec-
ularism and narrowly avoided dissolution by the
Constitutional Court. Another ongoing debate
has been that regarding the relationship between
religion and education: specifically, the curricu-
lum of imam hatip high schools, or Muslim cler-
ical schools, and the opportunities for graduates
of these schools. Yet these issues are only the tip
of the iceberg that is progressively cracking
under the weight of increasing polarization in
Turkey’s society. The most prominent area of
controversy is that of the headscarf and its ban
at universities and state offices.
When Abdullah Gül assumed the posi-
tion of President, it was not he, but rather his
wife, who became the subject of much discus-
sion in the country, as she openly wears a head-
scarf. In recent years, the headscarf issue has
become one of great magnitude in the coun-
try and a source of wide polarization. While in
Turkey, with a simple glance of the surrounding
crowds I saw some women wearing the tradi-
tional headscarf, some wearing a scarf cover-
ing the whole forehead and neck, and others
sporting no scarf at all, wearing instead the most
modern and fashionable of hairstyles. A divisive
debate is underway regarding a governmental
ban on the allowance of the headscarf in the
public sector, including universities and govern-
ment departments.
When Atatürk came to power, he believed
that headscarves were a threat to secularism.
The headscarf became a widespread legal issue
beginning in the early 1980s, when the Higher
Education Board began to restrict the wearing
of the headscarf in universities. (S¸entop, p. 2) In
the case of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey (2006), a Turk-
ish university student took her case to the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights and argued that
being forced to uncover her head violated her
right to freedom of religion as established in
Article 9 of the European Convention on
Human Rights. Sixteen of the seventeen judges
upheld the ban, using Turkey’s history and iden-
tity as a secular republic as justification. (Bot-
toni, pp. 176–77) However, Prime Minister
Erdog˘an sees the ban in all public institutions
as an issue of freedom; and the AKP has
attempted, though unsuccessfully, to lift the ban
on university campuses. A proposed amendment
to remove the ban became one of the factors
that provoked a closure case against the party.
One of the most debated questions regard-
ing the headscarf is what it actually signifies.
A significant portion of the Turkish popula-
tion view the headscarf as a political symbol;
it is a statement against the secular status quo
and the reigning Kemalist ideology. Many schol-
ars have echoed this consensus, although some
segments of the population are of the opinion
that the headscarf remains a practice of faith.
Proponents of the ban reiterate Atatürk’s logic
that the headscarf threatens Turkish secularism,
while those who oppose it argue that it directly
contradicts the right to freedom of religious
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practice and the right to education. Yet polls
reveal that the majority of Turks support free-
dom to wear the headscarf in university or state
office. (Çarkog˘lu and Toprak)
A breakdown by socioeconomic segments
reveals that the number of women wearing
the headscarf has recently increased in rural
areas and decreased in cities. Furthermore,
the number of covered women is negatively cor-
related to income level. (Çarkog˘lu and Toprak)
A 2007 poll performed by KONDA Research and
Consultancy and published in Milliyet found
that a positive correlation exists between the
percentage of participants that do not cover
themselves and their income bracket, from low-
est income to highest income. In keeping with
previously discussed data regarding education
by region and wealth, one would predict that
lower levels of education attainment in urban
and poor areas would result in a link between
low education and headscarf wearers, which is
in fact the case. The KONDA study explains that
the majority of women who cover their heads
have less than a high school education. Further-
more, as schooling increases, women are less
likely to cover themselves.
Based on these facts and the information
presented earlier in this article that connect
income, education, and political preference, it
follows suit that approximately 65 percent of
adult female women in the general population
cover their heads; but among women who voted
for the AKP in 2002 the number is 85–90 per-
cent. (“Religion, Secularism, and the Veil . . .”)
Regardless of motives or whether the ban on
headscarves should be abolished or maintained,
the link between socioeconomic status and party
preference is present once again when the head-
scarf debate is dissected from a demographic
perspective.
Political Trends in Recent Elections
As Turkey moves forward into the new
decade, an impending question will be how
the electoral landscape of the country will
change. Strong support in favor of the AKP
could serve as a mandate for some of the con-
troversial actions of the party, whereas declin-
ing numbers and regional shifts in support
will force the AKP to reexamine its political
agenda and perhaps its association with Islamic
ideology. In fact, some worry that increased AKP
support will serve as a catalyst for pursuit of
conservative constitutional amendments on
which the party has previously yielded. (Kaya
and Karaveli)
Regional voting trends observed from 2002
until the end of 2009 may provide some clue
as to the future of the party, particularly the
most recent local elections of 2009. However, as
Ali Çarkog˘lu explains, local elections, particu-
larly provincial general council election, may
provide some insight on electoral trends but
are not a clear predictor of general elections.
(p. 2) While the AKP has retained its spot as the
dominant political force in Turkey, some,
including Erdog˘an, considered the 2009 local
elections to be a disappointment for the party
since it did not capture the desired 45–50 per-
cent of the overall vote. Instead, for the provin-
cial general council election, the AKP received
about 38.8 percent of the total vote, the CHP
received 23.1 percent, and the MHP received
16.1 percent, whereas the respective percent-
ages from the 2004 provincial general council
election had been 41.7, 18.2, and 10.5. (p. 3)
Yet a regional examination of electoral data
reveals a more consistent picture for the lead-
ing party, with the AKP remaining the sole party
with a notable level of widespread support
throughout the country. Even so, the regional
divide between socioeconomic strata has
become more evident than ever, with the CHP
and MHP strengthening their support in the
western coastal regions. Meanwhile, AKP sup-
port in West Marmara was seven percentage
points less than their overall national figure,
in part due to the Western-leaning secular
attitude of the middle class along the coast
and their retreat from the AKP. (Kaya and Kar-
aveli) In particularly urban areas including
Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Bursa, the AKP has
lost notable support, whereas the CHP has done
the contrary. Furthermore, the AKP has seen
a decline in its share of the overall vote in small,
underdeveloped eastern provinces.
Çarkog˘lu explains that these movements
away from the AKP in the highest and lowest
socioeconomic levels of society may not be of
concern as the party continues to be domi-
nant in the large, conservative segments
throughout Anatolia, where the opposition is
virtually nonexistent. (p. 13) The party has
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essentially utilized its grassroots popularity, pos-
sibly at the expense of the Western metropoli-
tan areas. It is probable that the general elec-
tion of 2011 will see a continuation of the AKP
reigning supreme throughout Anatolia and
remaining popular among the voter type pro-
filed throughout this article. However, among
the upper echelons of Turkish society, the AKP
is suffering; and it is unlikely that the party will
be able to increase its overall share of the vote
from the 47 percent it won in 2007.
Educational Reform
Regardless of the AKP’s performance in the
general election of 2012 or the emergence of new
parties and failures of existing ones, Turkey faces
a larger issue that it must remedy before deeper
regional marginalization occurs. If education
is the predominant determinant of socioeco-
nomic status, as I have previously suggested, it
is then education that must be addressed in
order to decrease inequalities in Turkey.
Since the late 1990s, Turkey hasmade com-
mendable progress in educational reforms, alle-
viating issues of finance, access, and quality in
rural and poor areas; still concerns remain. Finan-
cially, programs such as the Conditional Cash
Transfer Program have provided poor families
with non-repayable assistance. (“The Develop-
ment of Education . . . ,” p. 23) An 85 percent
increase in the number of student scholarships
occurred between 2002 and 2009, with a total of
175,000 students receiving scholarships in 2009,
a number that should be raised even higher.
Accessibility of education has been significantly
improved in rural areas, and there have been
increases in programs that encourage students to
attend school. Students who live far from avail-
able schools have benefited from the implemen-
tation of busing programs and the construction
of hundreds of boarding schools. (p. 19)
Even with increased access and enrollment
in rural areas, the quality of education through-
out Turkey remains uneven. By increasing com-
pulsory education efforts, more students are
attending school, but this may compromise the
quality of education due to problems with over-
capacity and lack of resources. Programs such
as the Mobile Teachers Project have been imple-
mented to place skilled teachers in rural schools
and disadvantaged schools, and recent years
have seen more teachers in understaffed areas
of Istanbul and Southeastern Anatolia. Still,
an unequal distribution of teachers remains a
problem. (“The Development of Education . . . ,”
p. 18) Furthermore, class sizes remain well
above the desired limit of thirty students, and
numerous regions suffer from a lack of adequate
educational tools. (“Education Monitoring
Report . . . ,” pp. 13–14)
Two issues within the realm of educational
reform that need to be further examined and
remedied in upcoming years are fiscal policy and
performance evaluation. Turkey devotes four
percent of its GDP to education, while the OECD
average is six percent. Some believe that pub-
lic spending per primary level student is insuf-
ficient to achieve the most effective educational
experience. (Aydagül, p. 404) The Education
Reform Initiative, an organization of the Istan-
bul Policy Center at Sabancı University, reported
that 2004–2008 witnessed an increase in public
spending, with a slower rate of increase in the
amount of spending on public education. Mean-
while, the report claims that more public edu-
cation spending is not on the political agenda
for upcoming years. (p. 7) Instead, the private
sector is being encouraged to invest in educa-
tion through incentives such as a 100 percent
tax reduction for these investments. (“The
Development of Education . . . ,” p. 19) These
efforts have been successful in recent years;
yet it is my opinion that the country must avoid
an over-reliance on the private sector, and
should increase the portion of the general
budget designated for education.
The second suggestion that I have in the
realm of education is an improved strategy for
monitoring and assessing policies and reforms.
Batuhan Aydagül, Deputy Coordinator of the
Education Reform Initiative, explains that there
is a “lack of benchmark information and system-
atic empirical assessment,” which likely hinders
the ability to restructure policies and programs
in the areas that may be weak. (p. 405) Along
with new laws, decentralization of the Min-
istry of National Education has been on the
national agenda and is even mentioned in the
AKP program as a way to increase local admin-
istration better suited to regional needs. How-
ever, since discussions began in 2004, advance-
ments have been few. (“Education Monitoring
Report . . . ,” p. 5)
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Conclusion
It is simply not possible to diagnose what
political party may be most suited to lead the
country, or which stance on secular and reli-
gious issues that party should uphold. Nor it
is practical to assume that there truly exists a
concrete solution to remedy the sociopolitical
tensions that plague Turkey. Yet one issue must
be resolved in upcoming years; the socioeco-
nomic disparities that exist on a regional basis
throughout the country will only strengthen the
threat of clashing political and religious ideolo-
gies. There is an evident association, as I empha-
sized throughout this article, between socioe-
conomic status and political preference in
regard to religious ideology. While such sig-
nificant disparities in wealth and education exist
between social classes in Turkey, voters will con-
tinue to fail to agree on which issues plaguing
the country are the most important to address.
Furthermore, an open dialogue on the tension
between secularist and religious groups is
necessary to begin moving toward a resolu-
tion that will prevent the country from falling
victim to conflict and chaos, as has occurred
in many of Turkey’s neighbors. Yet commenc-
ing a national dialogue is only possible when all
participants are on even ground in terms of
standards of living and opportunities. The reme-
diation of educational problems is just one
step toward a resolution, albeit an important
one.
The issues discussed in this article are
tremendous, complex, and dynamic. Vast
amounts of literature and opinions exist on
the subject of Turkey’s sociopolitical environ-
ment, and tensions between segments improve
and worsen weekly as political parties change
direction. While the path of Turkey’s evolution
may be unclear, I am confident that the coun-
try will find a way to reconcile its Muslim and
secular identities.
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